Contents Preface-- Introduction: acting and enacting: mystical theology and its reception in France, Louise Nelstrop. Conway-- An eruption of mystical life in feminist action: mysticism and confidence after Bergson, Pamela Sue Anderson-- On the matter of God: conversations in the Khora, Tina Beattie-- The overflowing self: the phenomenology of possession in biblical and Indian mysticism, Jessica Frazier-- Phenomenology and theology: an essay on borders, Emmanuel Falque.
Mysticism in the French Tradition introduces key philosophical undercurrents and trajectories in French thought that underpin and arise from this engagement, as well as considering earlier French contributions to the development of mysticism. Filling a gap in the literature, the book offers critical reflections on French scholarship in terms of its engagement with its mystical and apophatic dimensions.
A multiplicity of factors converge to shape these encounters with mystical theology: feminist, devotional and philosophical treatments as well as literary, historical, and artistic approaches. The essays draw these into conversation. Bringing together an international and interdisciplinary range of contributions from both new and established scholars, this book provides access to the melting pot out of which the mystical tradition in France erupted in the twenty-first century, and from which it continues to challenge theology today.
Bibliographic information. Browse related items Start at call number: BV M95 To assume that the categories of current Western epistemology are adequate for interpreting spiritual approaches is to prejudge the results of such an encounter.
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Spiritual phenomena require other methodologies than the scientific for their elucidation; this is an underlying theme to this study and one to which we shall return when we consider our Wittgensteinian methodology in the following chapter. Experientialism and the apophatic We shall be returning to the apophatic in greater depth in the following chapters; however, in the context of our critique of modern mysticism it is worth raising an issue presented by Turner and McIntosh among others. It abhors the experiential vacuum of the apophatic, rushing to fill it with the plenum of the psychologistic.
It resists the deconstructions of the negative way, holding fast to supposititious experiences of the negative. This essentialism which has become a central part of modern definitions of mysticism23 has been comprehensively challenged by Stephen Katz in his essay Language, Epistemology 22 I am grateful to Professor Philip Sheldrake for this observation.
Thus they use the available symbols of their cultural-religious milieu to describe their experience. Though the language used by mystics to describe their experience is culturally bound, their experience is not. Katz Katz objects to these assumptions on several grounds. First, he disputes the idea that there are pure experiences of any type: That is to say, all experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty. Katz Therefore, the Hindu will experience Brahman, the Buddhist Nirvana and the Christian Unio Mystica — all three of which are specific to their categories and context and cannot be interposed.
Choosing 24 The Return to the Mystical descriptions of mystic experience out of their total context does not provide grounds for their comparability but rather severs all grounds of their intelligibility for it empties the chosen phrases, terms and descriptions of definite meaning. Katz Summary This has, by necessity, been a somewhat dense chapter. At one end Forman and the neo-perennialists have wanted to restore full ontological status to the category of mysticism See Forman , ; at the other end of the spectrum is Cupitt advocating a totally de-ontologized approach see Cupitt In between, with McIntosh , McGinn , Turner , Williams , , and Kripal , we see varying levels of ontological content imported into the category.
Unlike Underhill, Vaughan, 24 See e. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it. What can be shown, cannot be said. In addition, there have emerged differences of opinion as to how his literary legacy — his Nachlass — should be treated. However, as 27 28 The Return to the Mystical von Wright narrates in The Wittgenstein Papers in PO— it soon transpired that there was much more material than had originally been thought.
In his introduction to the Wiener Ausgabe WA Nedo gives the number of extant pages to date as 30, Regardless, the material of the Nachlass accordingly turned out to be vast. Although the work of the executors was punctilious and industrious they have not been entirely beyond reproach. Various attempts have been made to publish the Nachlass as a whole, beginning with the Cornell microfilm facsimile of Stern charts the unhappy evolution of the Wiener Ausgabe under Nedo which is only now just appearing.
However, perhaps the fullest and most accessible of all the attempts to open up the Nachlass has been the Bergen Electronic Edition , BEE which was produced in by the University of Bergen in Norway. The production of these various editions of the Nachlass has allowed scholars to see the shortcomings of some of the editorial decisions made by the original executors See Stern ; Savickey ; also BEE. The chief criticism is that the executors did not provide enough critical apparatus to justify their editorial decisions and it was left unclear why certain portions of the Nachlass were published in a A Wittgensteinian Methodology 29 certain way and not another.
This has been particularly the case with collections of Bemerkungen published in collections such as Culture and Value and Remarks on Colour.
The instructions he wrote into his works are numerous and often contradictory. Those selections that have been made have secured Wittgenstein a place among the first rank of Western thinkers. Regrettable, however, is that his editors do not always document their decisions, thus obscuring the relationship between the publicised material and its sources. Having examined them for the past twenty years, especially through the lens of the Nachlass editions, it is my conviction that they can only be read aright as a radical attempt to change our perception of philosophical problems.
He began by writing remarks into small notebooks. He then selected what he considered to be the best of these remarks and wrote them out, perhaps in a different order, into larger manuscript volumes. From my point of view, when we are reading Wittgenstein the style and presentation of his writings is as important as the substance — a tendency we shall see repeated when we examine the mystical texts later.
Kant had changed everything, but no one was sure just what Kant had said — no one was sure what in Kant to take seriously and what to put aside. The resultant typescript was then used as a basis for a further selection, sometimes by cutting it up and rearranging it — and then the whole process was started again.
Many of these commentators take as their key text the famous remark from PI on the nature of philosophy: Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. Consequently, among the Wittgensteinian secondary literature we see a split between those commentators who see the work of the later Wittgenstein as continuing the work of the earlier Wittgenstein and those who see a new anti-theoretical shift in the post-Tractatus works.
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, much of this mis interpretation may even arise from the confusion surrounding the publication of the Nachlass. We are thus left with four possible ways of viewing his works in the authors of the secondary literature. By this is meant the notion that the Tractatus and Investigations are two separate works, the latter intended as a specific critique of the former.
The tendency of the first phase is to lead to a notion of meaning which is truth-conditional and essentially realist, whereas that of the latter depends on a notion of meaning based around assertibility conditions and is essentially anti-realist. The classic exponents of this view are Dummett , Hacker and Pears b , among others. As we shall see later when we compare the means of expression in Wittgenstein and in the mystical texts of our mystical authors, how things are said may be as important as what is said. Cavell , For reasons given above regarding the difficulty of sorting out the publication of the Nachlass, it would at first 34 The Return to the Mystical sight seem odd to give the Investigations a cohesion of thought that its unsystematic collation would not seem to merit, which is why many of the contributors to the volume want to make a distinction between Part One and Part Two of the Investigations.
From the point of view of the interpretation of Wittgenstein presented in this book a key interpretation from On Certainty has been incorporated as understood by recent scholarship. As argued at the beginning of this chapter the confusion in the manner of publication of the Nachlass has probably contributed to the 3 On this see Kerr for an excellent summary. A Wittgensteinian Methodology 35 perception of different Wittgensteins with differing aims and intentions.
The concerns of the late s would not be his concerns today, yet his method would probably remain the same. Of all his later works perhaps On Certainty clarifies most clearly the movement that Wittgenstein had developed from saying to showing to acting and an inherent foundationalism that can, as Hutto argues, be found in his works well before From the early s onwards these have regularly appeared.
Although we seem now to be coming to the end of first-hand accounts of encounters with Wittgenstein, we still have the formidable body of literature which tries to interpret his philosophy through the events, actions and conversations that occurred in his life. In both we find Wittgenstein talking candidly about religion in a way that is not often so evident in his written remarks.
We shall return to this in our final chapters. The first point has already been discussed above.
Return to the Mystical: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Teresa of Avila and the Christian Mystical Tradition
Whereas Cavell et al. In this respect the notion of the significance of the confessional has been an important theme in many therapeutic interpretations of his work and one that will play a role here. In a sense the dreamer re-dreams his dream in surroundings such that its aspect changes. In considering what a dream is, it is important to consider what happens to it, the way its aspect changes when it is brought into relation with other things remembered, for instance. LC—46 It is to this that we turn next as we develop our own Wittgensteinian methodology for the study of the Christian mystical tradition.
An anti-method it may have been, but Wittgenstein still considered himself to be a philosopher going about the work of philosophy: I know that my method is right. My father was a business man, and I am a business man: I want my philosophy to be businesslike, to get something done, to get something settled. Style, or how something is said, determines for Wittgenstein what is said: In philosophy it is not enough to learn in every case what is to be said about a subject, but also how one must speak about it.
We are always having to begin by learning the method of tackling it.
RC III As Genova states: Nowhere in the zillion remarks patiently recorded in his notebooks can one find an explicit declaration of his aims and intentions. In part, he is reluctant to propound and declare like a scientist or prophet. Instead, sarcasm seems a better teacher than sincerity for would-be lovers of wisdom. The results, however, are few clues and even fewer descriptions of his new way of doing philosophy. As with poetry, wrenching the thoughts from their embodiment invariably does them damage.
One produces theory, the phenomenon Wittgenstein dreaded most, instead of change, the only thing that mattered to him. For Wittgenstein, I argue here, was clearly not intending to view philosophy sub specie aeterni T Let us look more deeply then at what he meant by the cultivation of this Blick. Hence the importance of finding and inventing Zwischengliedern. It designates our Darstellungsform viewpoint , the way we see things. Is this a Weltanschauung? PI A Wittgensteinian Methodology 43 Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. PI Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. This is nothing new to Wittgenstein but already in germinal form in the earlier Tractatus: the notion that language does not so much say as show see quote at the head of this chapter. The point is clarified in the remarks from Vermischte Bemerkungen: Clarity, perspicuity Durchsichtigkeit are an end in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as having a clear view durchsichtig before me of the foundations of possible buildings.
My goal, then, is different from the scientist and so my think-way is to be distinguished. VB 8 8 Written as a draft foreword to Philosophische Bemerkungen in In his last writing On Certainty, written as he lay dying in Cambridge, he clarifies the concept by contrasting a Weltanschauung with a Weltbild. In contrast to the Weltanschauung, which sees itself as the way of seeing, the Weltbild is a way of seeing: It the Weltanschauung takes itself too seriously, as the ultimate explanation and foundation of our convictions. In contrast, the concept of a Weltbild completely avoids the knowledge game.
I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter. A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, A Wittgensteinian Methodology 45 for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. In a note among the Vermischte Bemerkungen he remarks, inter alia, that Spengler as well as Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Boltzmann, Frege, Kraus, Loos, Weininger and Sraffa have influenced him VB and Drury notes that in the early s Wittgenstein was recommending that he read the work.
He is too often inaccurate. I once wrote that if Spengler had had the courage to write a very short book, it could have been a great one. We are in the habit, whenever we perceive similarities, of seeking some common origin for them. The urge to follow such phenomena back to their origin in the past expresses itself in a certain style of thinking. We are collating one form of language with its environment, or transforming it in imagination so as to gain a view of the whole of space in which the structure of our language has its being.
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In creating his own philosophical synthesis Wittgenstein was also indebted to the writings of the nineteenth-century physicist, Heinrich Hertz — We are therefore satisfied and ask no further questions. We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared up. Our confused wish finds expression in the confused question as to the nature of force and electricity.
But the answer which we want is not really an answer to this question. It is not by finding out more and fresh relations and connections that it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between those already known, and thus perhaps reducing their number. When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions. The ontological questions no longer concern us. They are these: 1. They make themselves manifest.
Drury iv 48 The Return to the Mystical I refer to this passage for two reasons. By delineating what can be said clearly we also delineate what cannot be said but can be shown.
Teresa of Avila: Doctor of the Soul - Peter Tyler - Google Libros
The aim of philosophy, for the later Wittgenstein, is: The uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of discovery. We can perhaps suggest that he opens an ontological door which Teresa, for one, is free to pass through. I am indebted to Chris Insole for help in elucidating this point.
A Wittgensteinian Methodology 51 truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these statements. Mystical discourse does not necessarily have to be reduced to empirical statements requiring empirical verification; the understanding of the discourse within its framework brings meaning. Both are expressed in propositions, and there is no better way of expressing them. Wittgenstein presents three moments to the communicative act: knowing, believing and acting.
The certainty of mystical discourse is not something to be derived but something from whence we start. Consequently, our emphasis here, using our Wittgensteinian perspective, will be on the form of mystical language game or what I will refer to as performative discourse. Instead of seeking something hidden, something that will explain a circumstance to us, intellectually and passively, Wittgenstein provides us with a more active kind of practical understanding. In short, we could summarize our position by suggesting that the meaning of mystical speech is found through transformative act.
We turn now to how this is done through the move from seeing to acting. Wittgenstein VB:c. As we shall see in the remainder of this book, our mystical writers are usually not so much concerned with enunciating metaphysical theories of theology as with providing a practical way of acting which will help a distressed person find peace and solace. Likewise, Wittgenstein is concerned to move the reader from thinking to seeing and finally acting. The reading of his philosophy, as has been emphasized all along, is not a passive act but must be an active engagement that challenges the reader to engage with the work at all levels; a strategy, as we shall see, which he shares with our mystical writers.
As in psychotherapy, both Wittgenstein and the mystical writers involve us in observing the foundations of possible buildings rather than trying to build one building — the Weltbild rather than the Weltanschauung See also Tyler This post-enlightenment way of knowing therapeutic discourse — to which we could also add mystical discourse requires a more interactive and immediate medium or frame of reference than either thinking or seeing provide.
For both Wittgenstein and our mystical writers discussed in this book, change and transformation are paramount. They entice us, excite us, goad and puzzle us. They are not meant to leave us alone. They instruct by example, by showing rather than saying. Shotter Accordingly, when in the following chapters we turn to the Sprachspiel of the theologia mystica we shall identify these Spiele as Performative Discourses for Changing Aspects.
They are discourses out of which action arises and which cannot be viewed without their concomitant context of action. The Tractatus 4. He is not going to bamboozle us or dazzle us with layers of sophisticated theory; rather he will challenge us to wake up and start thinking for ourselves. He says of his later philosophy: I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her key. OC Genova comments: Dressed as an old woman a guise used often by philosophers, e. Diotima instead of the conquering hero, Wittgenstein pads about his conceptual domain seeking what he mislaid, namely, the pictures that free one from the fly-bottle.
Its goal is pure performance in that once it completes its job, to change the way of seeing, it ought to self-destruct. Words ought to dissolve into the attitudes and actions from which they came. No longer the systematic 14 Conversation in Carshalton, March A Wittgensteinian Methodology 57 introduction, exposition and conclusion — these are the requirements of the Weltanschauung; the Weltbild has differing requirements.
His comments appear as a sequence of numbered remarks, sometimes apparently randomly thrown together, yet as we have already seen, we know that he took great time and trouble arranging and rearranging their sequence so that the discourse would have the desired performative effect on the person who engaged with it: They point or gesture towards ends that are somewhat alien to our current preoccupations.
Throughout his writings he uses them carefully, and develops and traces his strategic elucidations with care and caution. They recall us to our right relationship to our language, our selves and those around us. In terms of mystical discourse, we can talk about a play that reminds us of our right relationship with the triune God. Talking to himself Contradicting himself Avoiding arguments and conclusions Refusing orientating structures.
When we come to investigate the linguistic strategies, or performative discourse, of the theologia mystica we shall return to these strategies. For now it is necessary to conclude this chapter with a summary of the argument developed so far. Certain key aspects of the Wittgensteinian methodology have been isolated which will be adopted in the remainder of this book. Ultimately, I argued, this will inevitably lead to a change of life or action. I suggested that similar strategies may be found in mystical discourse and proposed to search for this performative discourse in the theologia mystica of the Western medieval Christian tradition.
In investigating these writings in Part Two from this Wittgensteinian perspective the following points will be borne in mind: 1. Following the arguments presented above, I shall be observing the Weltbild of the discourse. Although I shall not adopt an essentialist approach to mystical discourse I shall not, conversely, see that discourse as a cold constructivist narrative.
I will analyse the discourse from its performative or participatory perspective; that is to say, appreciating the transformational aspect of mystical discourse and how it leads, in a Wittgensteinian sense, from saying to showing to acting. I will be concerned with the whole communicative intent of mystical speech as transformative act. It was argued above how Wittgenstein delineates a philosophical method that concentrates as much on how something is said as much as what is said.
Therefore, in applying his methods to the mystical writings of the Christian tradition I will concentrate as much on how they say something as on what is said. In this chapter a move in Wittgenstein from thinking to seeing to acting has been isolated. Namely, what I propose to call the performative discourse of theologia mystica. It is to this that we turn now in Part Two of this book.
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The one resorts to symbolism and involves initiation. The other is philosophical and employs the method of demonstration. The one uses persuasion and imposes the truthfulness of what is asserted. The other acts by means of a mystery which cannot be taught. Dionysius Ep However, before we turn to those writings themselves it is necessary to clarify one final term which we have already introduced and which will be used from now on — namely that of theologia mystica.
The aim of this book is not to cover every aspect of the medieval tradition of theologia mystica but rather to demonstrate how one strand of its influence can be traced. Whether such a complete overview would be possible or desirable is questionable. However, perhaps the nearest one scholar has come to completing such an overview is Bernard McGinn in his five-volume Presence of God See Chapter One of this volume, and references in bibliography.
It is neither my intention nor desire to emulate that massive undertaking. The Creation of the Medieval Dionysian Tradition: The Corpus Dionysiacum Key to understanding the tradition of theologia mystica are the writings variously alluded to as the Dionysian Corpus.
Accordingly, it looks as though our author could not have been writing before the mid-fifth century and most likely dates from the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries. The pseudonym expressed the 1 2 The most recent scholarly edition of the original Greek texts is the Corpus Dionysiacum edited by Suchla, Heil and Ritter In this book we shall be largely concerned with the twelfth-century interpretations of the text that formed the tradition of theologia mystica in the West. Accordingly we shall concentrate on the Latin versions of the text found in Dionysiaca — , Patrologia Latina , Harrington and McEvoy For an up-to-date summary of contemporary academic debates on the Areopagite see S.
Coakley and C. Stang, Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite Luthers Werke, Weimar Edition Louth 3 Whoever the real author was and perhaps we shall never know , the texts represent a fascinating insight into the world of late paganism and emerging Christianity, suggesting, as Louth indicates, an interplay between the two forces.
Early on, scholia were written to the texts by John of Scythopolis and Maximus the Confessor,4 the former possibly in close contact with the original author. As already mentioned, the documents really entered the Western tradition with the gift of a codex from Michael the Stammerer to Louis the Pious in Denis in Paris, to translate into Latin; he went further in identifying the author of the texts with St. Denis, the bishop and martyr of Paris in his hagiographical Passio sanctissimi Dionysii See Chevallier Compounded with the identification with Dionysius, the first bishop of Athens first by Eusebius , the texts now assumed an authority that would be unassailable throughout the Middle Ages see Sells Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius.
See also Coakley and Stang and Golitzin Klerikale Stile and Rorem and Lamoreaux See Saffrey , Suchla and Louth Although they were known to Gregory the Great who refers to them in Homily 34 on the Gospels see Louth This would accord with medieval practices of translation as found later in centres of scholarly translation such as Toledo in Spain. In both cases one party would read out the manuscript which would then be orally translated from Greek to Latin by a second party, and finally written down by a third party.
The result is highly erratic and has been called unreadable Harrington ; he employs up to sixteen different translations for some Greek words and there seems to be little understanding of the text being translated. Later translations may have been more accessible but Eriugena retained something of the wildness and rough edge of the original. As with Wittgenstein 7 8 9 Unless otherwise stated, our main source for the Latin translations is Dionysiaca.
It is reproduced in Dionysiaca. See also Delaporte But herein was the working of that creative Spirit who made this man as fervent as he was eloquent. For love was the master who taught this man what he accomplished for the instruction and edification of many.
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The result is a unique synthesis that was to play a significant role in the future development of the theologia mystica tradition. Harrington Central to the twelfth-century revival of interest in Dionysius was Paris, especially its emerging university and the still influential Abbey of Saint-Denis see Haskins ; Knowles ; Morris Victor in Paris took particular interest in the Dionysian corpus. The abbey grew with the schools of Paris and was open to the new theological developments of the university, and from its inception it was concerned with questions on the relationship between the intellectus imbutos seu initiatos — id est on conscecratos — habet.
He set up a small community at the site of an old hermitage on the left bank of the Seine just beyond the walls of Paris. Almost, it seems, by accident, a community grew up around William who departed in to be made Bishop of Chalons. His disciple, Gilduin, was elected first abbot of the community in the same year and under his leadership the abbey grew and flourished. Following the Rule of St. Augustine, the community was at the forefront of clerical renewal through prayer, study and liturgy.
The abbey continued to flourish throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, surviving until the French Revolution when it was destroyed. From the point of view of our study, the chief development which would shape future interpretations of the Dionysian texts, and indeed the shaping of the tradition of theologia mystica itself in the late Middle Ages, was this very combination of intellectus and affectus in the understanding of the texts.
Of the first generation of Victorines, the most celebrated was Hugh of St. Victor — ; probably born in Saxony, he moved to St. Victor around and was elected abbot of the foundation in Recent scholarship has highlighted the complexity of the nature of the corpus Dionysiacum as it was taught at the university and disseminated throughout Europe. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale, lat.
He seems to have had knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew and evidently happy to consult contemporary Jewish authorities on the Jewish sense of the scriptures see Turner a; Rorem Finally there are the contributions of the Victorines: Hugh of St. Sarracenus produced his version of the corpus in —, the first full translation since Eriugena, some years earlier.
Victor to perfect and advance his own translation. In particular, he avoided the strange Greek-Latin hybrid words that Eriugena often produced from his straightforward transliterations of Greek terms. Victor See Solignac We know that he was translator of St. Denys under Abbot Odon between and and while John of Salisbury was in exile in France between and Victor and Vercellensis in the interpretive tradition of the Corpus Dionysiaca.
Drawing mainly on the translation of Sarracenus, he continued the tradition of glosses on the corpus, producing glosses on the whole Dionysian body, completed in We shall refer to this below. Following the Glosses, Gallus completed an Extractio of the whole corpus in Victor and was a professor of theology at the University of Paris. Thomas was subsequently elected prior in and abbot in Most of the next seventeen years were spent at Vercelli apart from a lengthy visit to England in where he had discussions with Grosseteste, another translator of the Dionysian corpus.
He was finally deposed as abbot in as a casualty of the thirteenth-century conflict between the Guelphs and Ghibelines. He may have been reinstated at the abbey before his death where his remains lie to this day. As stated above, Gallus is at the beginning of the second wave of Dionysian reception in the West following the first wave headed by Eriugena in the ninth century.
Here, as has been pointed out see especially Rorem —, and ; McGinn c , the affective interpretation of Dionysius begins to surface. Influenced by Augustine as passed down from Richard and Hugh of St. The final commentator and translator we shall refer to in this survey is the Englishman Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln c.
Thomas, like Bernard, remains Latin. Using the translations of Eriugena and Sarracenus, he used his own knowledge of Greek to further refine their work. Significantly, there is a uniformity of Latin word assignment, so that each Greek term tends to receive a constant Latin translation. As with our other authors, his translation was accompanied by a commentary and glosses. We shall use the translation found in Dionysiaca: R.
Victor and Sarracenus to produce a Dionysian omnibus for use in the university. It is this thread of interpretation of the Dionysian corpus made by subsequent writers that creates what we term the theologia mystica. Origins of the Theologia Mystica 75 modern periods the work of Gallus and Grosseteste was combined with that of the other authors mentioned. As McEvoy comments: It cannot be too much emphasised that the entire later interpretation of the Mystical Theology was deflected into the path it actually followed through the combined influence of Thomas Gallus and Robert Grosseteste.
Your email. Send Cancel. Check system status. Toggle navigation Menu. Name of resource. Problem URL. Describe the connection issue. SearchWorks Catalog Stanford Libraries. The Wiley-Blackwell companion to Christian mysticism. Responsibility edited by Julia A. Physical description xx, p.